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STUDENT NOTE
A Comparison of the Tax Consequences of a Sale of
Good Will with a Covenant Not To Compete
A, the owner of a business with tangible and identifiable in-
tangible assets valued at 75,000 dollars, sells his business to B for
100,000 dollars and A promises in the sales agreement that he will
not compete with B in this business for a specified time and within
a specified area. This transaction may give rise to serious tax
consequences which affect both A and B concerning the amount of
the contract price which exceeds the value of A's tangible and
identifiable intangible assets. A will argue that the 25,000 dollars
was the proceeds from the sale of a capitol asset which is good will,
resulting in capital gains treatment.' Should A prevail in this con-
tention, B in turn must capitalize this amount, a distinct disad-
vantage to B, because he will not be allowed to amortize the amount
as a deduction for income tax purposes.2 On the other hand, B
will argue that the amount was paid for a covenant not to compete.
' See, e.g., Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1956).
2 Farmers Feed Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 507 (1929).
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If this be the case, the 25,000 dollars received by A for the covenant
will be treated as ordinary income' which will be taxed at a higher
rate than capital gains, and B will now have the tax advantage of
amortizing the 25,000 dollars over the life of the covenant as a
business expense.'
Such a transaction is common. The parties should be afforded
guidelines to follow in assessing the tax consequences of their
venture. Much litigation has grown out of this area, but the cases
decided to date have failed to present a reliable guide for the
vendor and vendee in determining whether they have actually sold
good will or entered into a covenant not to compete so far as tax
aspects are concerned. Generally speaking, the courts will place
a value on the covenant not to compete if there is a rational basis
for saying the covenant had some value. The following discussion
is intended to point out factors the courts have considered in
deciding whether the covenant should be recognized as having
a value.
Good will is the benefit acquired in the purchase of a business
beyond physical assets, resulting from the patronage of habitual
customers and its local position, reputation, influence, or punctual-
ity.' It is the product of the confidence6 customers have in a bus-
iness, a preference over others in the race with competition!
Before good will may be considered a property interest and subject
to capital gains treatment, it must be capable of being transferred,
and thus, must depend upon more than the purely personal
qualifications of the owner.' Hence, a lawyer who has built up
a good reputation with his clients by rendering personal services
with skill cannot transfer this personal qualification as good will.'
3 See, e.g., Hamlin's Trust v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir.
1954).
4 Commissioner v. Gazette Tel. Co., 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).5 Estate of Masquelette v. Commissioner, supra note 1; see Horton v.
Commissioner, 13 T.C. 143, 148 (1949), for a definition of good will; see
Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. Jun. 335, 346, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Ch. 1810),
where Lord Eldon gave the first reported definition of good will when he
said, "The good-will which has been the subject of sale, is nothing more than
the probability, that the old customers will resort to the old place."6 Kenney v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962); see Watson v. Com-
missioner, 35 T.C. 203, 213 (1960), where the court held that good will was
"an opportunity to succeed to the advantageous position of a predecessor."
7 In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926).8 Brooks v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1128 (1961); accord, Watson v. Com-
missioner, supra note 6.
9 E. C. O'Rear, 28 B.T.A. 698 (1953); accord, Watson v. Commissioner,
supra, note 6.
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Moreover, it has been held that good will has an existence only
in connection with a going business and cannot be separated from
the specific business.'"
A covenant not to compete on the other hand is only a promise
whereby the vendor guarantees the vendee that he will not compete
with the latter in that business for a specified period of time and
within a designated area." The court must find that the covenant
has a distinct value before it will be deemed a covenant not to
compete rather than good will for tax purposes. To find a distinct
value, the covenant must not be "so closely related to the sale of
good will that it fails to have any independent significance apart
from merely assuring the effective transfer of that good will."1 2
In other words, it must be "severable".
In determining whether the covenant has a distinct value and is
thus severable from good will, the fact that the parties have
specified a certain value for the covenant in the contract has been
deemed controlling. This point was demonstrated in Yandell v.
United States," where a sum of 15,000 dollars was specified for the
vendor's covenant not to compete, and the vendor argued that this
amount was in reality only good will. The court held that the
covenant represented ordinary income mainly because of its speci-
fied character. The court further held that the vendor's testimony
that the covenant had no value was of little weight and that the
parties were aware of the tax consequences when the agreement
was signed. Another case held that the failure to specify in the
contract that the covenant was to have a value was substantial
evidence that this was the intent of the parties, but was not con-
clusive."4 In Payne v. Commissioner,'5 it was again held that the
parties were bound, with regard to tax effect, by the provisions
of the contract. There the court stated that when a lump sum was
provided for in the purchase agreement and no amount allocated
10 Grace Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949).
" 67 YALE L.J. 1261 (1958).
'" Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305, 307 (2d Cir. 1959); contra,
Schultz v Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961); see generally Michaels
v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 17 (1949), where the court distinguished between
a covenant with a separate value and a covenant dealt with separately by the
parties.
13 208 F. Supp. 306 (D. Ore. 1962).
1
4 Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961);
the court also states that when there was no allocation to the covenant, the
burden was on the vendee to show that the parties intended a value to be
placed on the covenant.
'22 T.C. 526 (1954).
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to the covenant, the covenant had no value. This was held to be
true even where the parties entered into a subsequent contract and
in fact did specify a certain value for the covenant. Thus, it will
be of no tax benefit for the parties to enter into a subsequent
contract as far as the court's determination of the value of the
covenant is concerned.
Though the courts generally determine that the covenant had a
value if the parties designated a value in the contract, one case
has held the covenant to have a value without a specific designation
in the contract.'6 In this case there was one lump sum designated
in the purchase agreement, and the covenant was not given a speci-
fied value. The purchaser allocated on his books a portion of the
purchase price to the expense of the covenant and began amortizing
this amount over the life of the covenant. The court held that the
purchaser could amortize that portion because he had proved that
he did not buy good will from the seller but only the covenant not
to compete. The purchaser was able to show that he had his own
customer lists and brand names and did not need the good will
which was connected with the business of the vendor. Significantly,
the court further stated that it was not bound to the strict terms
of the purchase agreement in determining the value of the covenant,
but could look at the circumstances to determine the actual value.
The court may place its own value on the good will and the
covenant not to compete when there is no designated allocation
to either in the purchase agreement. This was done in Levine v.
Commissioner,'7 where the vendor sold his fuel oil business for
85,000 dollars and gave a covenant not to compete. The vendor on
his books allocated 50,000 dollars to the sale of his physical assets
and 35,000 dollars to the sale of good will, and no value was given to
the covenant not to compete. On the other hand, the vendee allo-
cated 35,000 dollars to the covenant not to compete and wanted to
amortize this amount over the life of the covenant. The vendee
introduced evidence showing that the covenant had some value,
and the vendor was unable to prove that the covenant was without
value. In reaching what appears to be a fair and rational decision,
the court allocated 17,500 dollars to good will and 17,500 dollars
to the covenant not to compete. The vendor thus received capital
gain treatment on 17,500 dollars and ordinary income on 17,500
16 Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th
Cir. 1955).
,7 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963).
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dollars, and the vendee was permitted to amortize 17,500 dollars
over the life of the covenant even if he had to capitalize 17,500
dollars. It is important to note that the covenant was given a
value because the vendee subsequently was able to show that the
covenant had some value. Once again this seems to show that
the court will look beyond the terms of the contract if a more
just result can be reached.
The fact that the vendor was in a personal relationship with
the customers may in itself be enough for the court to hold that
the covenant is not severable from the good will and does not have
a value for tax purposes. Behind this reasoning lies the idea that
if the vendor was in a personal relationship with his customers,
the covenant is essential to the transfer of good will. Therefore,
it must be shown that the covenant was not needed to assure the
effective transfer of the good will if the covenant is to have a value.
The above reasoning was used in Barran v. Commissioner,'8 where
the court held the covenant to be severable and the amount paid
therefore was ordinary income to the vendor. In the Barran case
the vendor sold a dairy business and it was not the vendor but
rather the deliverymen who were in personal contact with the
customers.
Because the courts seem to give the covenant a value only when
there is some rational basis for doing so, the courts are apt to look
into the character of the covenant before a determination of value
is made. The court will employ this approach to prevent the parties
from creating an obvious "fake" situation. Such a situation would
exist where the vendor made a covenant not to compete which was
given a value in the contract and in reality the vendor was not
capable of competing with the vendee. Such a situation existed in
the case of Commissioner v. Killian.' 9 Here a vendor sold his in-
terest in an insurance partnership and there was included in the
purchase agreement a covenant not to compete. The court held the
covenant was of no value because the vendor was in ill health and
could not compete with the vendee even without the covenant. The
'1 334 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1964); accord, Brooks v. Commissioner, supra
note 8; see Ullman v, Commissioner, supra note 12, where the court held the
covenant to be ordinary income and the vendor was not in a personal relation-
ship with the customers.
19 314 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1963); see generally Hamlin's Trust v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 3, at 764, where the court stated, "The government may
look at the realities of a transaction and determine its tax consequences despite
the form or fiction with which it is clothed."
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fact that the covenant not to compete is to last for a limited period
of time has been held sufficient to find that the covenant was with-
out value. This point was emphasized in Schultz v. Commissioner,2"
where the covenant was to last for only one year. Moreover, it has
been held that the character of a covenant was bad when the ven-
dor could not compete with the vendee because of a trade agree-
ment with the industry. This was held to be true in Michaels v.
Commissioner,2 where the vendor of a laundry business was not
allowed by agreement to pirate away the customers of the vendee.
If the courts permit a party to show by evidence that the
covenant has a value, some mention should be made of the type
of evidence that the court will accept as persuasive that the
covenant has a value. The fact that the vendee can prove that he
would not have purchased the business in the absence of the
covenant is an example of the evidence which has been held to
be persuasive." However, this type of evidence also has been held
to not be persuasive where the court followed the strict opinion
that the covenant can not have a value unless its value is designated
in the contract.2"
One court based its decision on the fact that the vendors were
the stockholders of a corporation.24 Here the parties did allocate
a portion of the contract price to the covenant. The court held the
value of the covenant represented ordinary income to the vendors-
stockholders because stockholders of a corporation did not have a
direct proprietary interest in the corporate good will. The court
concluded that the sale of shareholders' covenant not to compete
can only be compensation for personal services, which is taxable
as ordinary income. It should be added that the court also based
its determination on the fact that the parties allocated a portion
of the contract price to the covenant.
From the aforementioned court decisions, it can be seen that
there are several tests that the courts will apply in determining
if the covenant has a value, depending upon the particular factual
situations that exist in each case. Because there is no one standard
that the parties can look to in preparing the contract, many times
2 0 Schultz v. Commissioner, supra note 12.
21 Michaels v. Commissioner, supra note 12.
22 Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 16.23 Annabelle Candy Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 14.
24 Ullman v. Commissioner, supra note 12.
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a party has been confronted with tax consequences which were
unexpected. This undesirable situation has prompted one author2"
to suggest that whenever there is a stated value placed on the
covenant not to compete this amount should be attributed to
ordinary income. He based his opinion on the fact that a covenant
is not property and is thus not a capital asset. Also, it was sug-
gested that this view would not greatly reduce tax revenue because
the vendor would have to include the amount placed on the
covenant as ordinary income and this would counterbalance the
tax advantage of amortization allowed to the vendee. In addition,
it was suggested that the vendor could specify that he would
receive his payments for the covenant over the life of the covenant
instead of in one lump sum, and there would not be any one
large amount of ordinary income received in any one year. Another
author26 has stated an opinion that adopts an approach different
from the preceding one. He suggests that the covenant not to
compete should always be treated as a capital asset because in
reality the covenant is a protection of the good will that the pur-
chaser has bargained for. Furthermore, it is pointed out, whenever
there is a covenant not to compete inserted in the purchase agree-
ment, it is the intent of both the vendor and the vendee that the
sole purpose for the covenant is to protect the acquired good will
of the vendee.
Regardless of which of these opinions is the sounder approach
in resolving the problems suggested in this note, it is obvious that
the existing situation is in need of remedy. The reasoning the
courts use in determining if there is a rational basis for finding
the covenant to have a value has been shown to vary with the
facts of each case. The cases seem to indicate that the practitioner
who arranges the sale of a business which includes a covenant
not to compete should specify in the contract that the covenant
has a designated value. Once this allocation has been made, the
vendee can then hope that the court finds there to be a rational
basis for saying the covenant had a value.
William Walter Smith
25 67 YAL L.J. 1266 (1958).26 Note, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 660 (1953).
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